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FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
by Thomas E. Baker * 
I. "THE SYLLABUS" 1 
I have lived in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit as a law student, law clerk, law teacher, and lawyer. Much of 
my academic career has involved that great court.2 I am honored to 
participate in this survey. Anticipating a readership of federal judges 
and practicing lawyers, however, gives me pause. 
The court,3 counsel and commentators must be aware of the real-
ity that our courts of appeals sit in most cases both as the appeal of 
right and as the final review. In the Dedication to last year's survey, 
Justice White made the point: 
The Supreme Court of the United States reviews only a small 
percentage of all judgments issued by the twelve courts of appeals. 
Each of the courts of appeals, therefore, is for all practical pur-
• Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. B.S., Florida State University, 1974; J.D., 
University of Florida, 1977. 
From August 1977 to August 1979, I was privileged to serve as law clerk to the Honora-
ble James C. Hill, then Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, now 
serving in the Eleventh Circuit. I dedicate this article to Judge Hill on the occasion of his 
tenth anniversary as a judge in the grand tradition of the third article. As my mentor and 
friend, lowe him a great deal more. 
I. "The syllabus" and what follows are the mere reflection of my subject. By 
disclaimer, I urge my readers to experience the court's handiwork firsthand. 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being 
done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus 
constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter 
of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & 
Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906). 
Reporter's Note, Slip Opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
2. See, e.g., Baker, A Postscript on Precedent in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 36 Sw. L.J. 725 
(1982); Baker, Constitutional Law, 27 Loy. L. REV. 805 (1981); Panel Discussion by C. 
Wright, L. Powe & T. Baker, Recent Supreme Court Decisions of Impact on Jurisdiction and 
Procedure in the Lower Federal Courts, 40th Annual Judicial Conference of the Fifth Judicial 
Circuit (Apr. 12, 1983). 
3. The generic reference "the court" will be used throughout the remainder of this arti-
cle. "The court" is the appropriate reference both to the entire court of appeals and to a 
particular division or panel. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247 
(1953). When relevant, I will distinguish considerations by an en banc court from a three-
judge panel. 
145 
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poses the final expositor of the federal law within its geographical 
jurisdiction. This crucial fact makes each of those courts a tremen-
dously important influence in the development of the federal law, 
both constitutional and statutory. Hence, it is an obviously useful 
and significant service to keep close track of and to publicize, par-
ticularly for the benefit of lawyers and judges, the work of the 
circuits.4 
The already weighty burden of judgment must become still heavier 
with the realization that, if not less fallible, these courts' decisions are 
more final in all areas of federal law, not just in federal jurisdiction.5 
As a result, the judges more than ever "need the needle from clois-
tered academe."6 Still it is with trepidation that I move from grading 
bluebooks to grading Federal Reporter, Second Series. 7 If I seem crit-
ical of the court or its decisions in the following pages, with then Pro-
fessor Holmes, I "trust that no one will understand me to be speaking 
with disrespect ... [for] one may criticize even what one reveres."g 
As with most law review writing, this article likely exists more to 
be written than to be read. I know that I have learned a great deal in 
its writing. As Justice White has suggested, however, surveys such as 
this should be written for lawyers. I have striven to approach these 
decisions with learning, but from a practical point of view.9 Perhaps, 
some lawyer in some federal court sometime will use something said 
here in the lawmaking partnership between bench and bar. That 
would be grand. It would be enough for me to pique a curiosity about 
4. White, Dedication, Fifth Circuit Symposium, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. ix (1984). 
Justice Rehnquist recently concluded, "The [Supreme] Court cannot review a sufficiently 
significant portion of the decisions of any federal court of appeals to maintain the supervisory 
authority that it maintained over the federal courts fifty years ago; it simply is not able or 
willing, given the other constraints on its time, to review all the decisions that result in a 
conflict in the applicability of federal law." Rehnquist, A Plea for Help: Solutions to Serious 
Problems Currently Experienced by the Federal Judicial System, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. I, 4-5 
(1984). 
5. My paraphrase is borrowed from Justice Jackson's observation on the Supreme 
Court: "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953). 
6. Goldberg, Introduction, 7 TEX. TECH L. REV. 243 (1976). 
7. Judge Goldberg, however, on behalf of the Court, has asked for such feedback: "Our 
papers are only rarely graded by our superiors, the Judges of the United States Supreme Court; 
hence, the only marks we can hope to receive come from the pages of the law journals of the 
nation, and we are grateful both for your criticisms and for your accolades and only hope that 
each year we will receive better marks." Id. 
8. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457,473 (1897). 
9. "Moreover, although the law is a highly learned profession, we are well aware that it 
is an intensely practical one." Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (Vinson, C.J.). 
HeinOnline -- 16 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 147 1985
1985] FEDERAL JURISDICTION 147 
the somewhat arcane topic of federal jurisdiction. Charles Dickens, 
who once worked in a law office, wrote, "we lawyers are always curi-
ous, always inquisitive, always picking up odds and ends for our 
patchwork minds, since there is no knowing when and where they 
may fit into some corner. ... "10 
Before going on with my "odds and ends" of survey period devel-
opments, one basic concept about my subject needs mention. I I The 
threshold "principle of first importance [is] that the federal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction."12 Thus, every federal court decision, 
in effect, is a precedent in federal jurisdiction. \3 The jurisdictional 
inquiry has always been two dimensional. Since the time of the Fram-
ers,14 the scope of federal judicial power has been determined first, by 
examination of article III of the Constitution and, second by interpre-
tation of the particular enabling act of Congress. 15 In this essay, I 
cannot catalogue every implicit decision for jurisdiction. Instead, I 
10. C. DICKENS, LITTLE DORRITT, reprinted in THE WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS, 
LITTLE DORRITT, National Library Edition, Book II, Ch. XII at 182 (1857). 
II. The survey period is from July I, 1983 to June 30, 1984. 
One event ending the survey period is at least footnoteworthy. On July I, 1984, the for-
mer Fifth Circuit "cease[d] to exist." Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 
1980, 28 U.S.c. §§ 1,41 (1982). Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided 
Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687, 705-07 (1981). I lament the final passing ofa truly great court. 
See WisdQm, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 Loy. L. REV. 787 (1980); but see Clark, Remarks 
at the Dedication of the New Fifth Circuit, 13 TEX. TECH L. REV. 233 (1982). 
12. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7, at 22 (4th ed. 1984). 
13. "Before a federal court exercises any governmental power, it has a duty to determine 
its own jurisdiction to act." Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 653 (1982) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the jUdgment). 
14. "As preliminary to any investigation of the merits ... this court deems it proper to 
declare, that it disclaims all jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or by the laws of the 
United States." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807) (Marshall, c.J.). 
IS. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 442 (1849); Hodgson & Thompson v. 
Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809). 
The second consideration has been the subject of great scholarly activity as of late. E.g., 
Sager, Forward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction 
of the Federal Courts in the Supreme Court 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981). In my 
opinion, "[t]he congressional dominion to expand and to contract federal court jurisdiction 
always has been correctly considered to be a plenary incident of the Article III power to 'from 
time to time ordain and establish' the 'inferior courts' of the United States." Baker, The His-
tory and Tradition of the Amount in Controversy Requirement: A Proposal to "Up the Ante" in 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 102 F.R.D. 299, 302 (1984). The judges of the Fifth Circuit seem to 
agree with me. See, MRT Exploration Co. v. McNamara, 731 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. May 1984); 
Texas v. United States, 730 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. Apr. 1984); Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, 
S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne De Navigation, 730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. Apr. 1984); 
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Texas InCI Airlines, Inc., 717 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. Sept. 
1983). 
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have been selective. I endeavor here to inform my reader of general 
survey developments and to comment on the most significant particu-
lars. A broad grouping of the survey decisions yields my sUbtopics: 
judicial power, federal questions, diversity, and federalism. My subti-
tles further my theme-determining whether a piece of litigation ap-
propriately belongs in or out of the federal court. 16 As then Chief 
Judge Brown introduced an earlier edition of this survey: "[T]he 
United States courts in the Fifth Circuit are always open. We are 
open to all who have a right to come in, and for those who do not 
have a right we are still open so that we can tell them SO."17 
II. "THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES .... "18 
Some perennial issues introduce the federal jurisdiction portion 
of this survey. Concerns for ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, the 
standing doctrine, and the case or controversy concern for mootness 
remind us of the higher law dimension of our subject and the vague-
ness of its boundaries. 
A. Pendent Jurisdiction 
Although the Supreme Court twice has failed to make the dis-
tinction, keep separate the two related concepts of ancillary jurisdic-
tion and pendent jurisdiction. 19 The two concepts have in common 
the curious notion that if a federal court has some jurisdiction it may 
have the power to reach beyond it and decide disputes not otherwise 
cognizable. The ancillary variation applies to claims and parties 
joined after the complaint by parties other than the plaintiff. The pen-
dent variation applies to claims raised by the plaintiff in the com-
plaint. During the survey period, the latter variation played 
prominently in a pair of decisions.20 Pendent jurisdiction allows a dis-
16. I leave to others the discussion of court procedures once the litigation has been as-
signed properly to a federal forum. See, Crump, Civil Procedure, Fifth Circuit Symposium, 16 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 115 (1984). 
17. Brown, Introduction, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 841, 844-45 (1977). 
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I cl. \. 
19. Professor Wright makes the distinction and notes the Supreme Court's two refusals. 
C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 19 at 103 n.1 (citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 
U.S. 365, 370 n.8 (1978) and Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. I, 13 (1976». 
20. See also Mooney Aircraft Corp. v. Foster (In re Mooney Aircraft, Inc.), 730 F.2d 367 
(5th Cir. Apr. 1984) (remanding with instructions to dismiss for want of ancillary jurisdiction 
an application in the Bankruptcy Court to reopen the estate and enjoin state wrongful death 
actions brought against the purchaser of the assets of the bankrupt company that had manu-
factured the aircraft involved in the fatal accidents). 
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trict court to reach a plaintiff's state law claim if jurisdiction exists 
over a "substantial" federal claim, the federal and state law claims 
derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact," and the related 
claims are such that a plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try 
them all in one proceeding."21 Exercise of pendent jurisdiction is 
committed to district court discretion and the Fifth Circuit regularly 
defers to that discretion. 22 Four factors guide the exercise of this dis-
cretion and its review: First, whether the state or federal issues domi-
nate "in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the 
comprehensiveness of the remedy sought;" second, the federalism 
concern for avoiding unnecessary federal decisions of state law "as a 
matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by pro-
curing for them a surefooted reading of applicable law;" third, general 
concerns for "judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the liti-
gants;" and finally, whether determination of the state law issue will 
preempt a constitutional issue. 23 Even though the claim may be juris-
dictionally pendent, the federal court may still choose to avoid deci-
sion by invoking some device like abstention or certification.24 
These pendent jurisdiction principles are illustrated by one sur-
vey decision each way. In the first, Laird v. Board 0/ Trustees, 25 prac-
ticing physicians brought suit challenging a university system's policy 
on use of campus infirmary facilities under the fourteenth amendment 
and state law. The court held that pendent jurisdiction could not be 
exercised, finding that state law issues predominated, were of state-
wide importance, and were unsettled. Concerns for economy, con-
venience, and fairness also buttressed the decision to dismiss the state 
claims because the federal claims had been dismissed prior to trial. In 
the second, Transource International, Inc. v. Trinity Industries, Inc.,26 
the court affirmed the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over state law 
antitrust claims, even though the federal antitrust claims were dis-
21. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
22. Wheeler v. Cosden Oil and Chern. Co., 734 F.2d 254, 262 (5th Cir. June 1984); Ham-
man v. Southwestern Gas Pipeline, Inc., 721 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983). But see Ware 
v. Reed, 709 F.2d 345, 354 (5th Cir. July 1983). 
23. Laird v. Board of Trustees, 721 F.2d 529,534 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983) (citing Hagans v. 
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 (1974) and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 
( 1966». 
24. Compare Sandefur v. Cherry, 718 F.2d 682, 689-90 (5th Cir. Oct. 1983) (opining 
abstention proper and certifying question to state court) with Walker v. U-Haul Co., 734 F.2d 
1068, 1075 (5th Cir. June 1984) (interpreting state statute as matter of first impression). 
25. 721 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983). See also infra text accompanying notes 185-95. 
26. 725 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. Feb. 1984). 
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posed of on summary judgment. The federal claims were not deemed 
frivolous and therefore were sufficiently "substantial" to anchor the 
state law claim. 
Common sense would suggest that court timing in dismissing the 
federal claim should control. If the federal claim falls before trial, 
usually the pendent state claim "should be dismissed as well. "27 Of 
course, in a complex case in which pretrial proceedings and discovery 
have been extensive, efficient use of judicial resources impells the fed-
eral court to go on. It may be that the allowable scope of the trial 
court's discretion is so broad that the appellate court only "lip-
synches" the factorial test before affirmance, at least when the discre-
tion has been exercised in favor of jurisdiction. If it seems curious to 
begin a discussion of federal jurisdiction with a doctrine that allows 
the reach of state law claims, remember that this functional concept 
goes back to Chief Justice Marshall's day28 and, as we have seen, con-
tinues to be a viable technique. Such are the boundaries of article III 
power. 29 
B. Standing 
The federal judicial power is generally limited to a consideration 
of "questions presented in an adversary context and in a form histori-
cally viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. "30 
As a court qua court, the federal tribunal must consider the jurisdic-
tional doctrines of standing and mootness. 
Justice Douglas' oft-quoted remark that "[g]eneralizations about 
standing to sue are largely worthless as such," is always well-taken.3) 
Black letter rules are more easily stated than applied. The standing 
inquiry is focused on the individual and not on the suit. . . "on the 
party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on 
the issues he wishes to have adjudicated."32 Standing jurisprudence 
27. 383 U.S. at 726. 
28. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,822·23 (1824). 
29. Even when the federal court has the power to hear the controversy, the almost mysti· 
cal doctrine of forum non conveniens may allow for dismissal in favor of some more convenient 
foreign forum. With the economies of the three Fifth Circuit States becoming more interna· 
tional, this arcane doctrine is occurring more frequently. See Koke v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 
730 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. Apr. 1984); Gahr Devs., Inc. v. Nedlloyd Lijnen, B.V., 723 F.2d 1190 
(5th Cir. Jan. 1984); Diaz v. Humboldt, 722 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984); Perusahaan 
Umum Listrik Negara Pusat v. M/V Tel Aviv, 711 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983). 
30. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968). 
31. Association of Data Processing Servo Org's., Inc. V. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970). 
32. 392 U.S. at 99 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court seems to be moving away from 
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has two sources. Article III itself requires: (1) injury in fact: "the 
party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he personally 
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the puta-
tively illegal conduct of the defendant' "; (2) causation: "the injury 
'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' "; and (3) redressability: 
the injury .. 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.' "33 
Those are the constitutional minima. The courts have imposed addi-
tional prudential principles not themselves constitutionally required: 
(1) a plaintiff usually may not invoke the rights and interests of third 
parties; (2) the grievance must be individual to the plaintiff and not 
merely generally suffered by the public; and (3) the injury must ad-
versely affect the plaintiff within the zone of interests protected by the 
substantive statutory or constitutional protection. 34 
The most significant survey decision on individual standing was 
KVUE, Inc. v. Moore. 35 A television broadcaster challenged the con-
stitutionality of a Texas statute establishing the rates for political ad-
vertising on radio and television and requiring sponsors to identify 
themselves. 36 The broadcaster had standing to sue. The threat of 
prosecution, usually insufficient alone, was very real because the 
plaintiff had violated the statute by charging higher than the statutory 
rate and alleged a desire to continue doing so in the face of written 
protests by some advertisers and a county attorney's announced will-
ingness to prosecute. Plaintiff thus climbed through a narrow window 
into federal court: "persons having no fears of state prosecution ex-
cept those that are imaginary or speculative" are shut out, as are per-
sons charged with a state criminal offense who may raise the 
constitutional issue before the state court as a defense. 37 Likely alone 
dispositive of the standing issue was the fact that the plaintiff had 
alleged an actual monetary loss suffered from past obedience to the 
statute. The causation and redressability factors followed; the statute 
caused the injury and the injury would be redressed by a declaration 
of unconstitutionality. 
this motion. See Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. 
Ct. 1660 (1983). 
33. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted). 
34. [d. at 474·75. 
35. 709 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. July 1983). The opinion also discussed the "case or contro-
versy" issue of justiciability. [d. at 927. 
36. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 14.09 (Vernon Supp. 1982). 
37. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,42,49 (1971). 
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The prudential principle against representative standing figured 
prominently in Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands. 38 Save Our Wet-
lands is a nonprofit corporation organized "to explore, enjoy and pre-
serve the State's wetlands, estuaries, forests, waters, streams, wildlife 
and wilderness. "39 The organization sued to prevent construction of a 
twenty-five mile long electric transmission line along the west bank of 
the Mississippi River. The court applied an exception to the pruden-
tial principle against representative standing which in public interest 
litigation has assumed near swallowing proportions.40 Under the ap-
plicable section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, the organiza-
tion had standing.41 First, the members of the organization otherwise 
would have had standing under section 10. Their injury in fact in-
volved aesthetics and well-being. The concern that the president of 
the organization fished the area and members would be aesthetically 
assaulted as they "ride through there on a pirouge" was enough. Be-
cause the action sought to compel an environmental impact state-
ment, the court excused the speculativeness of the actual damages. 
Second, the interests sought to be protected were germane to the or-
ganization's purpose as evidenced in its articles of incorporation and a 
resolution to preserve the Mississippi River environment. Third, 
neither the claim nor the requested relief would require the personal 
participation of the organization's members in the law suit. The court 
thus seemed to blur the distinction between the criteria for representa-
tive standing and the criteria for traditional standing. 
The KVUE, Inc. and Save Our Wetlands decisions are typical of 
the area in one regard; the injury in fact criterion has become the sine 
qua non of standing, which, once satisfied, usually preempts further 
concern for causation and redressability. These latter factors, how-
ever, may become determinative on occasion as they seemed to be in 
two other survey decisions. In the first, because plaintiffs alleged inju-
ries were caused by the employer's hiring and termination practices, 
they could not seek class-wide redress involving other employment 
38. 711 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983). 
39. Id. at 640. 
40. Baker, Constitutional Law, 27 Loy. L. REV. 805, 807-08 (1981). See also Vnited 
States v. Cronn, 717 F.2d 164, 169-70 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983). 
41. 711 F.2d at 639-40; See also 5 V.S.C § 702 (1982). 
In other survey decisions, the concept of statutory standing received some attention. See 
Walker v. V-Haul Co., 734 F.2d 1068, 1073 n.19 (5th Cir. June 1984) (Sherman Act, 15 
V.S.C § 2 (1982»; Transource In!'l, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 280-81 (5th Cir. 
Feb. 1984) (Sherman Act, 15 V.S.C §§ 1,2 (1982) and Clayton Act, 15 V.S.C § 14 (1982». 
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practices such as compensation, promotion, placement, and maternity 
practices.42 In the second, the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a 
state fixed fee per arrest system for constables because there was no 
realistic likelihood that the system would cause him harm in the fu-
ture even though he had once before been arrested.43 Thus careful 
counsel and court will consider each of the three criteria 
independently. 
C. Mootness 
Mootness is a second doctrine the federal tribunal must consider 
within the adversarial tradition. In contrast to the standing doctrine 
with its concern of parties, the mootness doctrine focuses judicial at-
tention on "the sequence of litigation events out of a traditional and 
constitutional concern for the very existence of a 'case or controversy' 
itself."44 If the matter once in controversy is resolved, then the judg-
ment of the court has nothing to accomplish. The lack of a judicial 
task ends the article III power. Justiciability must be actual and pres-
ent, not merely speculative and historical. As simple as the statement 
of principle is, however, its application has given the courts fits.45 
During the survey period, the court decided several mootness issues 
necessarily on a case-by-case basis. 
Several decisions declared that the matter sub judice was moot 
and, consequently, jurisdiction was at an end: when a criminal de-
fendant died while his direct appeal was pending;46 when their chil-
dren were returned to the plaintiff-parents seeking rehabilitative and 
ameliorative state services by reason of the temporary separation by 
the state agency;47 when a state court determined the dispositive child 
custody issue underlying the federal merits;48 when an individual 
42. Vuyanich v. RepUblic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195, 1200 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984). 
43. Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1445 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984). 
Equitable relief in such cases may be more difficult to obtain after the Supreme Court's 
decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983). 
44. Hill & Baker, Dam Federal Jurisdiction!, 32 EMORY L.J. 3, 18 (1983). 
45. For an example, read through the complicated series of opinions in Edgar v. Mite 
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
46. United States v. Cammarata, 721 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. Nov. 1983). In such matters "all 
proceedings had in the prosecution from its inception are abated." Jd. See generally United 
States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1980). 
47. Dorsey v. Moore, 719 F.2d 1263, 1264-65 (5th Cir. Nov. 1983). 
48. Franks v. Smith, 717 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. Oct. 1983) (dictum). The related fourth 
amendment issue was not thereby made moot, and was remanded for consideration on the 
merits. Jd. at 186. 
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plaintiff became a citizen and could reapply for a commISSIOn as a 
notary public;49 and when a subsequent state court decision resulted 
in both petitioner and respondent seeking dismissal of the federal 
habeas matter to allow for the pursuit of a state remedy. 50 
Invoking mootness is not a talisman, however, always ending in 
instant dismissal. The court has developed a habit of remanding to 
the district court for the moot ness determination when the continuing 
viability of the controversy is, in the least bit, unclear.51 In a once 
difficult and confused area, the moot ness doctrine now clearly sup-
ports jurisdiction in criminal cases because of possible collateral legal 
consequences even after release from sentence. 52 A plaintiff whose in-
junctive remedy may be made moot by post-filing events may avoid 
the doctrine by seeking money damages. 53 Finally, a commonly ap-
plied exception allows an otherwise moot controversy to survive. A 
suit may be raised from a mootness grave if the controversy is "capa-
ble of repetition yet evading review."54 Properly narrowed this excep-
tion applies if, and only if, the challenged action is of such brief 
duration as to be completed before the ordinary course of litigation 
has run and there is a reasonable likelihood that the complainant will 
suffer the same action again. 55 
Two survey decisions illustrate the last-mentioned exception. In 
49. Vargas v. Strake, 710 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. July 1983). rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom. Bernal v. Fairter, 104 S. Ct. 2312 (1984). The suit challenging the constitutionality of 
the citizenship requirement went forward in the name of a plaintiff who had not been natural-
ized. /d. 
50. Bullard v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 1020, 1023 (5th Cir. July 1983). Such exit collusion 
should be distinguished from the situation in which the concerted effort is to gain entry into 
federal court. The general rule is for dismissal of collusive suits, but there are famous exam-
ples to the contrary. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Lord v. Veazie, 49 
U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850). 
51. See Jefferson Bank & Trust Co. v. Van Niman, 722 F.2d 251, 252 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984) 
(suit to set aside sale and order new sale of vessel possibly mooted by alleged resale on the day 
before appellate argument); Ratner v. Sioux Natural Gas Corp., 719 F.2d 801, 803 (5th Cir. 
Nov. 1983) (suit by nonsettling defendants possibly mooted by district court approved settle-
ment in favor of plaintiff); Jordan v. City of Greenwood, 711 F.2d 667, 669 (5th Cir. Aug. 
1983) (remanded for consideration of subsequent amendment of statute which possibly could 
control suit and moot the constitutional issue). 
52. Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1411-12 n.2 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983). See generally 
Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Carafas v. 
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). 
53. Niles v. University Interscholastic League, 715 F.2d 1027, 1030 n.1 (5th Cir. Sept. 
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1289 (1984). But see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 
1660 (1983). 
54. See Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). 
55. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 12 at 55. 
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Valley Construction Co. v. Marsh,56 the court held that the present 
unavailability of the questioned contracts for bidding did not moot 
nonminority plaintiffs' suit against the government challenging as ar-
bitrary the setting aside of contracts for a minority enterprise pro-
gram. First, the evading review criterion included the appellate 
process which takes longer than the bidding. Second, the likelihood 
of repetition was obvious to the court since letting bids on contracts 
was constant. The court also found the exception satisfied in Gulf 
Coast Industrial Workers' Union v. Exxon CO. 57 While an appeal was 
pending from the union's successful suit for a preliminary injunction, 
the arbitrator entered an award in favor of the union. The injunction 
had forbade the employer from disapproving a health insurance car-
rier until the arbitration over health coverage was completed. It was 
enough for the court to suggest that the same union might seek an-
other preliminary injunction pending another arbitration. Such is the 
chimerical nature of the mootness doctrine and the "capable of repeti-
tion yet evading review" exception. 
III. " ... ALL CASES, IN LAW AND EQUITY, ARISING UNDER THIS 
CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND TREATIES 
MADE, OR WHICH SHALL BE MADE UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY 
"58 
A. General Federal Questions 
Creating an understanding of the "arising under" jurisdiction 
phrase found in article III and the general civil statute, section 1331,59 
could occupy this entire volume and still be rendered in a vain at-
tempt. The preeminent federal jurisdiction scholar has observed, 
"Though the meaning of this phrase has attracted the interest of such 
giants of the bench as Marshall, Waite, Bradley, the first Harlan, 
Holmes, Cardozo, and Frankfurter, and has been the subject of volu-
minous scholarly writing, it cannot be said that any clear test has yet 
been developed."60 Far be it from me to arrogate to add my name to 
56. 714 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983). 
57. 712 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983). 
58. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2, cl. I. 
59. 28 U .S.c. § 1331 (1982) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." (em-
phasis added). 
60. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 17, at 91 ("The key phrase, both in the Constitution and 
in the statute, is 'arises [sic] under.' "). 
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such a distinguished list of failure. Instead, I have chosen three sur-
vey decisions to discuss here with the hope that some of the subtlety 
and nuance of this fascinating and important topic may be 
appreciated.61 
Powers v. South Central United Food & Commercial Workers Un-
ions and Employers Health & Welfare Trust 62 is first. The issue was 
whether the action was one arising under federal law.63 The court 
began with first principles; under the well-pleaded complaint rule, ju-
risdiction "must be determined from what necessarily appears in the 
plaintitrs statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, un-
aided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses 
which it is thought the defendant may interpose."64 Even an antici-
pated defense based on federal preemption of state law is irrelevant 
under the rule. 65 The plaintiff sub judice was a participant in a jointly 
trusteed employee health and welfare plan (the "Plan") maintained in 
accordance with the Labor Management Relations Act66 and subject 
to the Employee Retirement Income Security ACt.67 She sued the 
61. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188, 1192-93 (5th Cir. Feb. 1984) 
(suit was one "arising under" Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, §§ 16(c), 17 as amended, 29 
U.S.c. §§ 216(c), 217 (\982»; Smith v. Winter, 717 F.2d 191, 198-99 (5th Cir. Oct. 1983) 
(Complaint failed to allege cause of action "arising under" Voting Rights Act of 1965, as 
amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982»; Niles v. University Interscholastic League, 
715 F.2d \027, 1029-30 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1289 (1984) (complaint 
"arising under" the Constitution); United States v. O'Neil, 709 F.2d 361, 375 (5th Cir. July 
1983) (remand for amendment of complaint to comply with well-pleaded complaint rule). 
62. 719 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. Oct. 1983). 
63. The court considered both the general federal question statute, Section 1331, see 
supra note 60 and, 28 U.S.c. § 1337(a) (1982) which provides for original jurisdiction over 
civil actions arising under federal statutes regulating trade or commerce. The analysis under 
both statutes was the same. 719 F.2d at 767. 
The decisive issue concerning "arising under" itself arose in the context of removal juris-
diction. The suit had been brought in state court originally and was removed to the district 
which ruled that because the state court did not have jurisdiction the district court had no 
derivative jurisdiction and the suit was dismissed. The Fifth Circuit held that since the suit did 
not fall within the federal jurisdiction, the state court did have jurisdiction and the removal! 
dismisal based on the argued federal question of preemption was improper. Ultimately, the 
matter was remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to the state court. Such 
are the vagaries of removal jurisdiction, which did not figure in any prominent survey decision, 
for which I, in tum, am grateful. See, Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983); 
Smith v. Winter, 717 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. Oct. 1983). 
64. 719 F.2d at 763 (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914». The rule 
often becomes critical in removal situations. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers 
Vacation Trust, \03 S. Ct. 2841 (1983). 
65. 719 F.2d at 764-65. 
66. 29 U.S.c. §§ 141-187 (\982). 
67. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982). 
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Plan alleging that the Plan's misrepresentation of coverage consti-
tuted negligence and fraud and violated the Texas Deceptive Trade 
Practices-Consumer Protection Act.68 The preemption of state law 
by the federal statutes arose only as a defense in the Plan's pleadings. 
Applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, the Court held that the 
cause of action arose under state law. Here the court seemed to fi-
nesse the arising under standard by applying the narrow choice 
among competing formulations that the suit arises under the "law 
that creates the cause of action. "69 Last considered was the corollary 
to the well-pleaded complaint rule that a plaintiff may not defeat re-
movapo by such artificial pleading as to leave out essential federal 
issues.71 Even though plaintiff had filed a parallel suit in federal court 
alleging violations of the federal statutes which the defendant Plan 
asserted preempted her state law suit in state court, her insistence on 
maintaining the independent state law suit was honored. 72 
In a classic survey transition, the second decision for discussion 
came in Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding. 73 While the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts to enter declaratory judgments has long been secure,74 that 
device sometimes confuses the "arising under" inquiry. Of course, 
the court in Lowe began with the well-pleaded complaint rule. 75 Go-
ing beyond the just considered Powers opinion's facile statement that 
the case arises under the law creating the cause of action,76 the court 
noted that the federal element must be essential considering the na-
ture of the claim.77 The court's test resembled one prominent com-
mentator's distillation: "a substantial claim founded 'directly' upon 
68. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984). 
69. 719 F.2d at 765 (quoting American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 
257, 260 (1916). There are several other permutations of the "arising under" standard. See 
generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§§ 3562-3567 (1975). 
70. See supra note 64. 
71. 719 F.2d at 765-67. See generally Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 
394, 397 n.2 (1981); In re Carter, 618 F.2d \093 (5th Cir. 1980), cerro denied, 450 U.S. 947 
(1981). 
72. 719 F.2d at 766 n.5. 
73. 723 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984). 
74. See, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). But see Franchise Tax Bd. 
v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, \03 S. Ct. 2841 (1983). 
75. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
76. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
77. 723 F.2d at 1178. 
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federal law."78 Devotees of federal jurisdiction, however, are re-
minded of another distinguished commentator's reaction: "this [test] 
seems as good as any, but it must be recognized that the books con-
tain some results, and a good deal more language, inconsistent with 
it."79 At least, it explains the court's holding in Lowe. The plaintiffs 
sought a declaration whether a shipyard employer, self-insured under 
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 
(LHWCA),80 which has paid compensation under LHWCA to em-
ployees contracting asbestosis during their employment, has an in-
dependent cause of action against the manufacturer of asbestos-
containing products used in the shipyard, for the excess of the com-
pensation so paid over the amount for which the employees settle 
their third party claims against the manufacturer. 81 Of course, the 
declaratory judgment statute is procedural only and creates no subject 
matter jurisdiction.82 Plaintiffs-employees did not assert a claim aris-
ing under LHWCA against the shipyard employers but sought the 
declaration on the effect of LHWCA on claims the shipyard employ-
ers might otherwise have against the manufacturers. The fact that the 
cause of action was the declaratory defendant's does not control, 
rather, the question becomes whether the declaratory defendant could 
have litigated the precise issue in a coercive action in federal court. 83 
On the question whether there is federal question jurisdiction when "a 
party seeks a declaration that he is immune, by virtue of federal law, 
from a nonfederal claim that the other party may have," some deci-
sions adopt a broad view that sustains jurisdiction and other decisions 
adopt a narrow view that denies it. 84 In Lowe the Fifth Circuit de-
cided to adopt the narrow view and held there was no jurisdiction, 
noting the Supreme Court's recent indication of approval of that 
view. 85 The court admitted86 that this holding arguably was a retreat 
78. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 168 
(1953). 
79. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 17 at 96. 
80. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982). 
8\. See Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969). 
82. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). 
83. 104 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2767, at 740 (2d ed. 1983). 
84. [d. at 742, quoted in Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173, 1180 (5th Cir. Jan. 
1984). 
85. 723 F.2d at 1180 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 
103 S. Ct. 2841, 2850 (1983». 
86. 723 F.2dat 1180-81 n.7. 
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from the more expansive view taken in earlier Fifth Circuit deci-
sions87 which, at the time they were decided, had gone beyond deci-
sions in other circuits. 88 On the basis of later decided Supreme Court 
precedent, the Lowe court distinguished those prior Fifth Circuit deci-
sions as examples of an exception in favor of jurisdiction when a 
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against imminent state regulation 
which is preempted by a federal statute. 89 Nevertheless, this decision 
portends a slight narrowing of the federal question jurisdiction in de-
claratory actions.90 
The last considered federal question decision raises an interesting 
issue of federal jurisdiction, but the court did not reach the issue. If 
that seems anomalous, it was, anomalous jurisdiction that is! The ma-
jority in Linn v. Chivatero91 said, "we need not determine whether the 
plaintiffs have met the strict requirements for the exercise of anoma-
lous jurisdiction . . . nor need we decide the interesting question of 
whether the doctrine of anomalous jurisdiction survives .... "92 
What is anomalous jurisdiction?93 The doctrine has empowered a fed-
eral court to order the return of property improperly seized by federal 
87. See Braniff Int'l, Inc. v. Florida Pub. Servo Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1978); 
St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. City of Tyler, 375 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1967); Florida East 
Coast Ry. V. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 328 F.2d 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 830 
(1964). 
88. McFaddin Express, Inc. v. Adley Corp., 346 F.2d 424 (2d Cir., 1965), cert. denied, 
382 U.S. 1026 (1966); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Toledo, Peoria & W. R.R., 324 F.2d 936 (7th 
Cir. 1963). 
89. 723 F.2d at 1180-81 n.7 (citing Shaw V. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2899 
n.14 (1983)). 
90. See generally Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Preemption Claims: A Post-Franchise 
Tax Board Analysis, 62 TEX. L. REV. 893 (1984). 
91. 714 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983). 
92. [d. at 1281. The majority opinion, written by Judge Randall and joined by Judge 
Thornberry, held that the district court had general federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 
and that the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.c. § 7421(a} (1982), did not apply to bar plaintiff's 
request for an injunction ordering the return of documents produced in response to an Internal 
Revenue Service summons. 
Chief Judge Clark, concurring in the judgment agreed that there was jurisdiction and 
would have applied the Anti-Injunction Act, but concluded that an exception to the Act could 
apply under Enochs v. William Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. I (1962). Thus he agreed 
with the court's judgment reversing and remanding for further consideration. 714 F.2d at 
1285, 1289 (Clark, c.J., concurring in the judgment). 
The issues beyond anomalous jurisdiction are not of concern here, although the Anti-
Injunction Act is another good example of congressional power to control federal court juris-
diction. See supra note 16. 
93. Prior opinions detail the origins and content of the doctrine. See, e.g., Richey v. 
Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 1243-45 (5th Cir. 1975); Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29, 31-35 (5th 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). 
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officers before the initiation of any civil or criminal proceedings. It 
has been analogized to the federal rule of criminal procedure allowing 
for motions of return of property94 and to general notions of equity. 
The notion was based on the courts' inherent power to supervise the 
actions of officers of the courts and was extended, most importantly, 
to apply to IRS agents. The decisions may be described as restraintful 
as exercise has been reserved for the most egregious situations show-
ing a "callous" disregard for constitutional rights. Candidly, applica-
tion involved looking forward to the merits.95 
I agree with the forceful argument by Chief Judge Clark, concur-
ring in the judgment: "The doctrine should be put to rest."96 Even 
assuming arguendo that the concept was once valid, today it is a doc-
trine sans rationale. Originally, the jurisdiction was fabricated to cir-
cumvent the amount in controversy requirement in general federal 
question cases, now itself an anachronism.97 Today, "[i]t is impossi-
ble to imagine a case in which anomalous jurisdiction would have ex-
isted that [does] not involve a federal question. "98 Linn is its own best 
example. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their rights under the 
fourth and fifth amendment - clearly a federal question. Finally, 
anomalous jurisdiction runs counter to the congressional policy 
against court interference in the collection of taxes underlying the 
Anti-Injunction Act. It may be that the majority's careful reservation 
of the issue quoted above successfully postpones decision for another 
day, but Chief Judge Clark's side opinion seems to belie that read-
ing.99 As Justice Jackson once observed, "[t]he case which irresist-
ably comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, 
according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er consent," -
94. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e). This provision merely codifies the doctrine. See Pieper 
v. United States, 460 F.Supp. 94, 96 n.1 (D. Minn. 1978). 
95. See 714 F.2d at 1286 (Clark, c.J., concurring in the judgment). 
96. Id. 
97. 28 U.S.c. § 1331 (1982). 
The amount in controversy may still be important under special federal question statutes. 
See, Martinez v. United States, 728 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. Mar. 1984); Wardsworth v. United 
States, 721 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983), petition for cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3806 (U.S. Apr. 
19, 1984) (No. 83-1706). 
98. 714 F.2d at 1285 (Clark, c.J., concurring in the jUdgment). 
99. Chief Judge Clark's approach is more straightforward. First, there is no anomalous 
jurisdiction. Second, there is general federal question jurisdiction. Third, the Anti-Injunction 
Act prohibits court action unless it is clear that the government may not prevail and that the 
taxpayer has suffered irreparable injury and the legal remedy is inadequate. Id. at 1287-88 
(Clark, C.J., concurring in the judgment). See also Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431 (5th 
Cir. Sept. 1983). 
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consented.' "100 
B. Civil Rights Jurisdiction 
One special category of federal questions merits attention here, 
for some of the federal jurisdiction issues predominate the substantive 
doctrine. While the substantive law of civil rights is treated elsewhere 
in this survey, here I wish to mention a few jurisdictional develop-
ments.101 Although section 1983 provides a remedy for "any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof,"102 there is still the obvious, but sometimes overlooked, no-
tion of standing. 103 For example, a couple in whose care a child had 
been left for two and one-half years could not sue officials for an al-
leged deprivation of the custody of child without due process because 
they were not related biologically and they had not adopted the child 
legally. State law and the relevant federal decisions permitted suit 
only by "those who have interests stronger than those deriving from 
an informal social unit." 104 On the other side of a civil rights action, 
the defendant must be a "person" and the word has become some-
thing of a term of art. lOS 
The identity of the person sued often determines the existence 
100. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 19 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
101. See Rees, First Amendment, Fifth Circuit Symposium, 16 TEX. TECH L. REV. 187 
(1984); Lee, Employment Discrimination, Fifth Circuit Symposium, 16 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
207 (1984); Bubany, Criminal Law & Procedure, Fifth Circuit Symposium, 16 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 269 (1984). 
Except to note a representative sample here, I will not discuss decisions involving either 
the alternative substantive provisions or the matter of attorney fees. See, Page v. U.S. Indus., 
Inc., 726 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. Mar. 1984) (discrimination in employment); Carter v. Orleans 
Parish Pub. Schools, 725 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. Feb. 1984) (Rehabilitation Act); Villanueva v. 
McInnis, 723 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984) (conspiracy); Hart v. Walker, 720 F.2d 1436 (5th 
Cir. Dec. 1983) (attorney fees); Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. EEOC, 720 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 
Dec. 1983) (attorney fees); Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983) 
(directly under the Constitution); EEOC v. University of Texas Health Sciences Center, 710 
F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983) (age discrimination); Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016 (5th 
Cir. July 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1000 (1984) (attorney fees). 
102. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1982). 
103. See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text. 
104. Franks v. Smith, 721 F.2d 153, 155 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983). See Smith v. Organization 
of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (foster parents); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (di-
vorced father». 
105. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 22A, at 121. Compare, e.g., Monell v. Department of 
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) with Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1967). 
The issue is recurring. See generally Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 
Apr. 1984) (en banc). 
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and the degree of immunity. The immunity doctrines have created 
multiple pigeon holes, each specifically labelled. l06 Three gradations 
of immunity further complicate the matter. First, there is absolute 
immunity, which protects against any liability for all actions in an 
official capacity and is reserved for few officials such as judges and 
prosecutors.107 With such actors, the only issue is whether the con-
duct involved was within the scope of their official duties. If a judge, 
for example, the conduct issue is whether the function is normally 
performed by a judge and whether the party dealt with the judge in an 
official capacity.108 Second, there is a qualified immunity, a protection 
for reasonable dealings. This defense permits state officers to be sub-
jected to suit only if their conduct clearly violated an established stat-
utory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have 
known.109 Third, some defendants have no immunity. In this cate-
gory, the most significant survey pronouncement came from the 
Supreme Court in Tower v. Glover. I 10 There the Supreme Court held 
that although an appointed attorney does not act "under color of' 
state law by virtue of the appointment, the state action requirement is 
met when the attorney engages in a conspiracy to deprive the defend-
ant of federal rights. I I I More importantly, the Supreme Court went 
on to hold that state public defenders are not immune from liability in 
such a case. This result dramatically changes Fifth Circuit law. Mc-
Coy v. Gordon, I 12 decided during the survey period is illustrative. 
Plaintiff, a convicted murderer serving a life sentence, sued all the 
officials involved in his prosecution including the state judge, various 
106. See T~wer v. Glover, 104 S. Ct. 2820 (1984) (state public defenders); Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (presidential aides); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) 
(president); Supreme Court of Va. v. Virginia Consumers Union, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980) 
(judges); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. III (1979) (legislators); Butz v. Economou, 438 
U.S. 478 (1978) (members of the executive); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prose-
cutors); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (governors). 
107. McCoy v. Gordon, 709 F.2d 1060, 1062 (5th Cir. July 1983). 
108. Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185, 189-90 (5th Cir. May 1984); Arsenaux v. Roberts, 
726 F.2d 1022, 1023 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 975-76 (5th 
Cir. July 1983). 
109. See, Howard v. Fortenberry, 723 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. Feb. 1984) (regional and parish 
sanitarians); Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 
2150 (1984)(sheriff and deputy); Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. July 1983)(proba-
tion officer); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. July 1983) (prosecutors outside role). 
110. 104 S. Ct. 2820 (1984). 
111. [d. at 2824. See also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Dennis v. Sparks, 
449 U.S. 24 (1980). 
112. 709 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. July 1983). 
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county officials, the prosecutor, and his own two lawyers, one of 
whom was appointed. The court dismissed the appeal as to all but 
one of the non-lawyer defendants. After Tower, the allegation that his 
own two lawyers conspired with the other defendants may have saved 
the claim against them from dismissal. In states like Texas, which 
have no public defender system and rely on the appointments system 
in indigent cases, the potential of the Tower holding is obvious. Suits 
by pro se plaintiffs with prison return addresses are an everyday real-
ity. Defending against civil rights suits, even spurious claims, may 
dramatically increase both the burden of the bars' professional re-
sponsibility pro bono publico and the cost of malfeasance. 
In the area of substantive law, civil rights cases ignore the Bard's 
warning that "borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry." I 13 The civil 
rights statutes have no limitation provision. The federal courts go a 
borrowing from the forum state's statutes of limitation, choosing the 
one most analogous. This is not always easy, for the federal court 
must divine the "essential nature" or "gravamen" of the complaint. 114 
The analogies may be strained. I 15 One point is distinct-the determi-
nation when a federal cause of action accrued is a question of federal, 
not state, law. 116 In other matters as well, state law curiously is of 
little consequence. It is now settled that state judicial remedies need 
not be exhausted in civil rights suits, although labelling the complaint 
a petition for habeas corpus relief triggers an exhaustion require-
ment. 117 The general rule is that the federal remedy is available re-
113. Neither a borrower nor a lender be; 
For loan oft loses both itself and friend; 
And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry. 
W. Shakespeare: HAMLET - PRINCE OF DENMARK, Act I, Scene III. 
114. Suthoffv. Yazoo County Indus. Dev. Corp., 722 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983), 
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2389 (1984). 
115. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Imco, Halliburton Servs., 724 F.2d 511, 513 n.4 (5th Cir. Feb. 
1984) (parties agreed); Suthoff, 722 F.2d at 136-37 (landowners' claim that defendants con-
spired to have city initiate expropriation proceedings analogized to abuse of process); Watts v. 
Graves, 720 F.2d 1416, 1422-23 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983) (state officials violations of federal law 
analogous to one year state limitation category); Cross v. Lucius, 713 F.2d 153, 156-59 (5th 
Cir. Sept. 1983) (action for wrongful deprivation of black ancestor's land analogized to state 
prescription statute). 
116. Suthoff, 722 F.2d at 138; Watts, 720 F.2d at 1422-23. 
117. See Davis v. Page, 714 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983) (per curiam); Jackson v. Torres, 
720 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983). The Fifth Circuit did not persuade the Supreme Court that 
exhaustion was appropriate. Pasty v. Florida InCI Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981) (en 
banc), rev'd sub nom. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Brantley v. Surles, 718 
F.2d 1354, 1359-60 (5th Cir. Nov. 1983). 
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gardless of the availability of an adequate remedy under state law. 118 
The court pushed this notion so far as to suggest that "the possibility 
that a parent's claim for the wrongful death of a child under section 
1983 may have an existence quite apart from the state's wrongful 
death provision." 119 Finally, state law may be relevant to eliminate 
the federal cause of action. If there is a state tort cause of action 
which provides adequate postdeprivation redress then that may pro-
vide all the process due. 120 
IV. "CONTROVERSIES 
STATES .... "121 
. BETWEEN CITIZENS OF DIFFERENT 
Caveat lector! I am a notorious diversity abolitionist. 122 I wish I 
did not have to write this section. Congress shows no immediate sign 
of overcoming its inertia and folly, however, and the federal courts 
continue to bear the burden of these cases. 123 Therefore, a mere sur-
vey writer has no choice but to summarize developments. 
A. General Issues 
Garden variety diversity cases provide little grist for the com-
mentator's mill. The requirement for diversity of citizenship, of 
course, is jurisdictional and in multiple party litigation lapses by 
plaintiff's counsel in joining defendants can cause difficulties. 124 Be-
118. Brantley v. Surles, 718 F.2d 1354, 1357-58 (5th Cir. Nov. 1983). 
119. Logan v. Hollier, 711 F.2d 690, 691 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983), cm. denied, 104 S. Ct. 
1909 (1984). Cf Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183 (1977) (dismissing claim for wrongful 
death of child under § 1983 because said claim was never pleaded in petitioner's complaint nor 
presented in petition for certiorari). 
120. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See generally Hill & Baker, supra note 45, at 
51-56. See also McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863, 869-70 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983); McCoy v. 
Gordon, 709 F.2d \060, \062-63 (5th Cir. July 1983); Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 383 
(5th Cir. July 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 248 (1984). 
12 \. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 5. 
122. Baker, supra note 16, at 30 \. 
123. The Fifth Circuit has recognized, however, that a magistrate may conduct trials and 
enter final judgments in a diversity case with the consent of the parties. 28 U.S.c. § 636(c) 
(1982); Puryear V. Ede's Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153, 1154 (5th Cir. Apr. 1984). Accord Collins V. 
Foreman, 729 F.2d \08 (2d Cir. 1984),petitionforcert.filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3777 (U.S. Apr. 2, 
1984) (No. 83-1616); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic 
Clinic of America, Inc. v. Istromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane) petition for 
cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3875 (U.S. May 16, 1984) (No. 83-1873); Wharton-Thomas V. United 
States, 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983). In districts with long trial delays, this option may be 
attractive to judges, lawyers, and litigants. See generally Note, Federal Magistrates and the 
Principles of Article III, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1947 (1984). 
124. Verret V. Elliot Equip. Corp., 734 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir. June 1984) (plaintiff's join-
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cause the matter is jurisdictional, the court has a "duty to notice party 
alignment and apply proper realignment sua sponte on appeal."125 
The court is to determine realignment according to "the principal 
purpose of the suit and the primary and controlling matter in dis-
pute."126 In Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, one defendant had no dis-
pute with the plaintiffs. However, on the principle issue that 
defendant took the plaintiffs' position opposite to the other named 
defendant. Thus, realignment as a plaintiff was necessary, although 
the move destroyed diversity. 
B. Section 1359 
The most significant diversity jurisdiction decision during the 
survey period was Bianca v. Parke-Davis Pharmaceutical Division of 
Warner-Lambert CO. 127 Section 1359 provides that a district court 
does not have jurisdiction over a civil action "in which any party, by 
assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or 
joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." 128 The issue in Bi-
anca was whether the citizenship of an administratrix should be disre-
garded under section 1359. An eleven year old girl from Mississippi 
contacted aplastic anemia and died after taking a cold medication. 
The parents, also from Mississippi, resolved to sue the prescribing 
physician, the supplying pharmacist, and the manufacturer of the 
drug. Over the course of preparing for suit, the parents became so 
distraught that they decided either to find an administrator or to 
forego the litigation. They selected the mother's sister, Ms. Bianca, a 
resident of Louisiana, as a person with sufficient family ties to press 
the suit. When the state court appointed administratrix brought a 
diversity suit for wrongful death, the two individual defendants, each 
a resident of Mississippi, raised section 1359. 
The history of section 1359 outside the Fifth Circuit is a another 
ing of nondiverse defendant ended jurisdiction and court would not set aside the denial of the 
motion to set aside dismissal even though state prescription period had run); De Me10 v. Toche 
Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1262 n.1 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983) (diversity jurisdiction a\1eged only 
after nondiverse defendant was dismissed). 
125. Lowe v. Inga\1s Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173, 1178 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984). See also 
supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text. 
126. Id. at 1178 (quoting Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. First Nat'l Bank, 351 F.2d 519, 
522 (5th Cir. 1965). 
127. 723 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984). 
128. 28 U.S.c. § 1359 (1982). 
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whole chapter. 129 Within the Fifth Circuit, the Court adopted the 
"motive/function" test in 1970.13° Although a question of fact, fed-
eral law applied. The nominal real party in interest under state law 
was a formalism behind which the federal court would 100kYI The 
Fifth Circuit has refined the test over the years. 132 First, the Court 
asked whether there was a motive to manufacture diversity. Second, 
the Court evaluated the substance of the appointment to determine if 
it was worthy of recognition. The Bianca opinion still further refined 
the analysis in two important particulars: first, the administrator 
need not have a substantial stake in the wrongful death action 
brought for the estate. 133 Second, the unlikelihood that the adminis-
trator will encounter bias as an out-of-stater is irrelevant.134 Next, the 
court rejected a rival test from the Fourth Circuit. 135 The Fourth 
Circuit had adopted a "substantial stake" test which virtually ignored 
motive and only considered whether the administrator had a substan-
tial stake in the outcome of the diversity suit. 136 While the rejected 
Fourth Circuit test was more direct and easier to apply and furthered 
the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the language of the statute con-
trolled. In what may be the first ever application of the plain meaning 
rule to the obscurant section 1359, the Bianca panel concluded that 
motive was made controlling by the statutory phrase "has been im-
properly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction." 137 
129. See generally, 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE §§ 3637-3642 (1982). 
130. Bass v. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 
975 (1971). 
131. The test came from the Third Circuit. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d 
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969). 
132. See White V. Lee Marine Corp., 434 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1970); Green v. Hale, 433 
F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1970); Bass V. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 975 (1971). 
133. 723 F.2d at 398. 
134. [d. at 396. 
135. It seems curious that the court deemed itself competent even to evaluate the Fourth 
Circuit's approach. To have adopted the competing approach would have meant the overrul-
ing of prior Fifth Circuit precedents. Despite the Bianca panel's hubris, the rule of interpanel 
accord is a Fifth Circuit fixture. "[E]arlier decisions of any panel [are] binding precedent, 
absent intervening en banc or Supreme Court action." Baker, supra note 12 at 723. Cf also 
FED. R. ApP. P. 35(a)(I) (full court consideration may be "necessary to secure or maintain 
uniformity of its decisions"). 
136. See Bishop V. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974). 
See also Gross V. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1039 n.IO (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 
1281 (1984) (rejecting Fourth Circuit's approach); Betar v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, 
Ltd., 603 F.2d 30, 35-36 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1098 (1980). 
137. 723 F.2d at 398 (quoting 28 U.S.c. § 1359 (1982» (emphasis added by the court). At 
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Maintaining Fifth Circuit precedent, the court held for something of a 
totality of circumstances approach. On remand, motive and purpose 
were to be the ultimate inquiry. Factors to be considered included: 
(1) the relationship between representative and represented; (2) the 
representative's powers and duties; (3) any special ability possessed by 
the representative; (4) whether some nondiverse individual would be a 
more natural choice; (5) any announced explanation of the choice; 
and (6) whether the suit is wholly local in natureYs The district 
court may disregard the citizenship of an administratrix only after 
applying these factors and finding that the representative was named 
with a purpose to manufacture diversity.139 Significantly, the court 
suggested an exception in dictum that diversity jurisdiction would be 
upheld even if the administratrix is named with a purpose to create 
diversity, so long as the person has a stake in the outcome or substan-
tial duties beyond the suit. 140 Such is the rule in the Fourth and 
Tenth Circuits already. 141 Whatever the future of the law in the Fifth 
Circuit, the Bianca decision will be a landmark in the law of section 
1359. 
C. The Erie Doctrine 
We have it on the best of authority that "[n]o issue in the whole 
field of federal jurisprudence has been more difficult than determining 
the meaning of [the Rules of Decision Act]."142 Since 1789, the con-
troversy has been whether the decisions of state courts are "the laws 
of the several states" and hence binding on federal courts in diver-
sity.143 Since then the Supreme Court's answer has changed from 
negative l44 to ambiguous l45 to affirmative l46 and has always been con-
least the court did not simply look up the words in a common dictionary. See Corabi v. Auto 
Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 788 (3d Cir. 1959) (en bane). 
The American Law Institute would have the citizenship of the represented party attrib-
uted to the representative. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE STUDY OF DIVISION OF JURISDIC-
TION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1301(b)(4) (Official Draft 1969). 
138. 723 F.2d at 395 (quoting Green v. Hale, 433 F.2d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 1970». 
139. [d. at 398. 
140. [d. at 398 n.7. 
141. See Hackney v. Newman Memorial Hosp., 621 F.2d 1069 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 982 (1980); Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 
(1974). 
142. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 54, at 347. 
143. judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 92, codified 28 U.S.c. § 1652 (1982). 
144. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
145. The leading proceduralist of the period wrote in 1928 "though the cases here are 
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troversial. So much so that a cynic might suggest that a great deal of 
the controversy is a by product of the tenure track.147 Too much of 
federalism is at stake, however, to be overly cynical. Space and time 
limitations prevent a canvass of this area. I will have to rely on vague 
and distant socratic dialogues from first year civil procedure. For ex-
ample, "Was the holding in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins really constitu-
tionally required?"148 For present purposes, it is enough to borrow 
from Judge Learned Hand the observation that we live in .. 'erie-
antompkinated' days."149 State common law is a rule of decision in 
diversity cases. 
The related question, which state's law controls, was answered in 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing CO. ISO The Klaxon co-
rollary requires that a federal court must apply the conflict of laws 
rule of the state in which it is sitting whenever a question arises as to 
which substantive state law applies. 15l When a diversity case is trans-
ferred from one federal court to another, the Klaxon rule goes so far 
as to oblige the transferee court to apply the conflict of laws rules of 
the transferor court's state. 152 
These rules are clear of statement but are difficult to apply. The 
determination of the conflict of law rule of the forum state may be 
legion, these rules and their application are notoriously far from clear." DOBIE, FEDERAL 
PROCEDURE 558 (1928), quoted in C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 54, at 348. 
146. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
147. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, §§ 54·60, at 347·97 (for citations to a repre-
sentative sampling of the relevant literature). 
148. See id. § 56 at 359-64. Answer: "On an issue that left the scholarly writers so di-
vided, and about which the Supreme Court has been so cryptic, it would be foolhardy to 
venture a confident answer. . . . If the Court believes it is deliberately deciding a constitu-
tional question, it is wise to suppose that the constitutional question has been decided, unless 
and until some later Court suggests a different answer." ld. at 362-63. 
149. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. 
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 269 (1946). See generally Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56 
TEX. L. REV. 1011 (1978). 
While there is no federal general common law there is indeed a federal common law. See 
Wayne v. TVA, 730 F.2d 392, 398 (5th Cir. Apr. 1984); Wehling v. CBS, 721 F.2d 507, 508 
(5th Cir. Dec. 1983). 
150. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
151. ld. at 496. The rule has been criticized as encouraging forum shopping among the 
state courts and as failing to take the opportunity for the disinterested federal courts to create a 
coherent system of conflict of laws. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, §57, at 369. The Supreme 
Court has persisted despite these criticisms. See Day and Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 
U.S. 3, 4 (1975). 
152. James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166, 169 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983); Cowan v. Ford 
Motor Co., 713 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983). See generally 28 U.S.c. § 1404(a) (1982); 
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). 
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troublesome for the federal court, and, at times, may be confusing. 
Consider Morris v. LTV Corp.153 and Brown v. Cities Service Oil 
CO.,154 both of survey vintage. In Morris, a contract action, the court 
applied a general and dated Texas conflict of laws rule that questions 
of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the 
cause of action arose, but matters of remedy and of procedure are 
governed by the laws of the state where the action is brought. 155 In 
Brown, a tort action, the court applied the Texas conflict of laws rule 
that questions of substantive law are controlled by the tort law of the 
state having the most significant relationship to the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the controversy.156 Both cases relied on prece-
dents from the Supreme Court of Texas. Prior to the Fifth Circuit's 
decisions in Morris and Brown, the Supreme Court of Texas had an-
nounced a new conflicts rule in contract cases which applied the law 
of the state with the most significant relationship to the particular 
issue,157 which paralleled its 1979 decision which had adopted a simi-
lar approach in tort law. 158 Finally, note that determining the conflict 
rule is half the task. Application may tax the role-playing ability of 
the federal court, as when a district court in Louisiana must pretend 
to be a Louisiana state court pretending to be a Kansas state court. 159 
Nothing much strange there. 
Even if the federal judges are persuaded that a generic state pre-
cedent is unsound they may not disagree with the state judges. 160 The 
federal judges, however, may in fact disagree among themselves on 
just what the state rule really is,161 even to the point of a fourteen 
judge en banc review and eight-three-three division,162 in what has to 
be seen as a waste of judicial resources. Indicia of state law is not 
153. 725 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. Mar. 1984). 
154. 733 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. June 1984). 
ISS. 725 F.2d at 1027. 
156. 733F.2datI159. 
157. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). 
158. Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979). See Crim v. International Harves-
tor Co., 646 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981). 
159. Delhomme Indus., Inc. v. Houston Beechcraft, Inc., 735 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. July 
1984). 
160. See Hermann v. General Motors Corp., 720 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir. Nov. 1983) 
("[GJenerically similar factual situation" in state decision controlled). 
161. Morgan v. Freeman, 715 F.2d 185, 190 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983) (Jolly, J., dissenting); 
Measday v. Kwik-Kopy Corp., 713 F.2d 118, 128 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983) (Rubin, J., dissenting). 
162. See Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. Apr. 1984) (en 
banc). See also Sturgeon v. Strachan Shipping Co., 731 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. May 1984) (en 
bane). 
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limited to recent, definitive holdings of the jurisdiction's highest 
court. The most recent and most authoritative decisions applicable 
are, however, controlling. 163 A single decision rendered nearly sev-
enty years ago may be enough. 164 The federal court is Erie bound to 
follow an authoritative holding of an intermediate state court unless it 
is persuaded that a higher state court would disagree. 165 When the 
intermediate state courts are divided, the federal court may even role 
play the part of state supreme court and resolve the conflict. 166 Fi-
nally, prior federal readings of state law "tea leaves" are to be fol-
lowed unless valid reason exists to reject them. 167 This last notion 
also applies to the relationship between federal trial and appellate 
courts. Although a district court's conclusions of fact are subject to 
rule 52's "clearly erroneous" standard of review, the appellate court is 
free to reexamine and reach its own conclusions of law. 168 But a fed-
eral district court's determination of the law of the forum state is enti-
tled to great weight on review due to the trial court's experience and 
familiarity with the law of the state. 169 
Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction, however, still re-
main federal courts. The state of the art in Supreme Court precedent 
distinguishes between issues governed by the federal rules of proce-
dure and issues not so governed. 170 First, when applicable, a valid 
163. Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 715 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir. Sept. 
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1288 (1984). 
164. See 713 F.2d at 126. 
165. Taylor v. Jim Walter Corp., 731 F.2d 266, 267 (5th Cir. May 1984); Birmingham Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Winegardner and Hammons, Inc., 714 F.2d 548, 550 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983). 
166. See McLaughlin v. Herman & Herman, 729 F.2d 331, 334 (5th Cir. Apr. 1984). 
167. See Hasty v. Rust Eng'g Co., 726 F.2d 1068, 1070 (5th Cir. Mar. 1984) (United States 
Supreme Court decision dismissing appeal from Texas Supreme Court for want of a substantial 
federal question); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Guynes, 713 F.2d 1187, 1190 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983) 
(prior Fifth Circuit decision). 
168. See FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a); See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 967 (5th Cir. 
1983); United States v. Grayson County State Bank, 656 F.2d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 920 (1982). 
169. See Acree v. Shell Oil Co., 721 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983); Smith v. Mobil 
Corp., 719 F.2d 1313, 1317 (5th Cir. Nov. 1983); Halpern v. Lexington Ins. Co., 715 F.2d 191, 
192 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983); Humphrey v. e.G. Jung Educ. Center, 714 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 
Sept. 1983). 
While the rule seems well-ensconced in the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit en banc court 
recently cast off on its own course by holding that district court's interpretations of state law 
will be reviewed under an independent de novo standard. Churchill v. FIV Fjord, 739 F.2d 
1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
170. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
How we arrived at our present state and much of the subtlety and nuance of the art of 
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rule of federal procedure commands obedience. Second, for issues not 
controlled by the first rule, the federal court is obliged to consider 
"the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping 
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws."171 Survey 
decisions were typical. Under the first rule, the federal court in a di-
versity suit must follow the federal rules of evidence,172 the federal 
rules of civil procedure,173 and general federal procedures for the 
manner of conducting the proceeding.174 
Application of the second rule draws an important line. The 
"constitutional power of the states to regulate the relations among 
their people" is on one side, and the "constitutional power of the fed-
eral government to determine how its courts are to be operated" is on 
the other. 175 One recurring survey phenomenon illustrates the impor-
tance of this line. Discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance 
of inequitable administration of state law require that "a defendant is 
amenable to the personal jurisdiction of a federal court in a diversity 
case to the extent permitted a state court in the state where the federal 
court sits." 176 Besides its frequency of application, this rule has two 
characteristics which yield a peculiar synthesis. First, under the Erie 
doctrine the forum state's long arm provision must apply, including 
state court interpretations. Second, the state statute, as interpreted, 
must satisfy the fourteenth amendment's due process standard, as ap-
plied on the particular facts.177 Thus, the state law, including a state 
such decisions is left to the reader's other devices. See generally 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & 
E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4508-4513 (1976). 
171. 380 U.S. at 470-72. 
172. Cook v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 720 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983) 
(FED. R. EYID. 407); Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. Oct. 1983) 
(FED. R. EYID. 401). 
173. Timberlake v. A.H. Robins Co., 727 F.2d 1363, 1364 (5th Cir. Mar. 1984) (FED. R. 
CIY. P. 56(e»; Rosales v. Honda Motor Co., 726 F.2d 259, 260 (5th Cir. Mar. 1984) (FED. R. 
CIY. P. 42(b»; Kelly v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 709 F.2d 973, 977 (5th Cir. July 1983) 
(FED. R. CIY. P. 19(a». 
174. Martin v. Texaco, Inc., 726 F.2d 207,216 (5th Cir. Mar. 1984) (manner of giving 
instructions); Big John, B.Y. v. Indian Head Grain Co., 718 F.2d 143, 148 (5th Cir. Oct. 1983) 
(materials submitted to and used by jury); McHann v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 713 
F.2d 161, 164 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983) (sufficiency of evidence to create a jury question). 
175. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 59 at 387. 
See Walters v. Inexco Oil Co., 725 F.2d 1014, 1017 (5th Cir. Mar. 1984) (Mississippi 
statute imposing a penalty on an unsuccessful appellant applies in a federal diversity case); 
Baber v. Edman, 719 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. Nov. 1983) (state notice statute binds federal 
diversity court in malpractice action). 
176. DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983). 
177. In the exercise of in personam jurisdiction, the constitution requires that a nonresi-
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law thesis and a federal constitutional thesis, binds the federal 
court. 178 As a result of the Erie doctrine, then, the federal court must 
evaluate the constitutionality of the state's long arm statutes. 179 
V. "OUR FEDERALISM"18o 
I borrow Justice Black's heartfelt phrase to mean more than the 
doctrine it serves as sobriquet. In this section I mean to discuss gener-
ally the relations between state and federal courts. This matter is of 
no small significance. Indeed, "[t]he happy relation of States to Na-
tion - constituting as it does our central political problem - is to no 
small extent dependent upon the wisdom with which the scope and 
limits of the federal courts are determined."181 
A. Sovereign Immunity 
Generally, relations between state officials and federal courts are 
structured by notions of sovereign immunity and the eleventh amend-
ment. 182 The constitutional provision does not act as a grant of im-
munity to the states. The states are not exempted from the limits of 
federal law but are still suable for actions within the amendment, but 
only in state court. Far from being some forgotten and esoteric aside 
in constitutional law, these concepts "go to the very heart of a federal 
system and affect the allocation of power between the United States 
and the several states."183 
There are five hornbook issues in each application of eleventh 
amendment jurisprudence: first, whether "the plaintiff [is] one to 
whom the amendment applies"; second, whether "the suit [is] truly 
dent defendant have some minimum contacts with the forum state resulting from affirmative 
acts and imposing the obligation to defend in the forum is not unfair or unreasonable. World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 
(1958). 
178. 711 F.2dat 1265. 
179. See Growden v. Ed Bowlin and Assoc., Inc., 733 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. June 1984); 
Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1984); Estate of Portnoy v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 730 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. Apr. 1984); DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 
F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983). 
180. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,43-46 (1971) (Black, J.). 
181. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT - A 
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 2 (1928). 
182. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States, by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or SUbjects of any Foreign 
State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
183. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 48, at 286. 
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against the state"; third, whether "the suit seek[s] relief in a manner 
that is barred by the amendment"; fourth, whether "the state [has] 
waived its immunity"; and finally, whether some "congressional stat-
ute ... override[s] the immunity."184 During the survey period, the 
Supreme Court rewrote those principles, especially the third, in Pen-
nhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,185 a decision which has 
already begun to work significant changes in Fifth Circuit law. 186 
Plaintiffs sued various state and county officials alleging violations of 
several federal rights, both constitutional and statutory, and a state 
statutory right. The judgment before the Supreme Court did not 
reach the federal issues but held for the plaintiffs on the pendent state 
law claim and entered broad injunctive relief. 187 The Supreme Court 
majority rethought basic eleventh amendment theory. At one time 
the bar was interpreted to prohibit any suits in which the plaintiff 
sought to restrain or to compel the action of a state official performing 
official duties imposed by constitutional state laws. 188 Later judicial 
refinements narrowed the bar to prohibit private plaintiffs from im-
posing a liability which must be paid from public funds from the state 
treasury either in damages or in expenses necessary to comply with a 
prospective order. 189 Now the bar is once again broadened. The 
Halderman majority began with the major premise that the eleventh 
amendment bars suit against state officials when the state is the real, 
substantial party in interest. Ex parte Young,190 rightly considered 
one of the most important constitutional decisions in the history of 
the Republic, was the Supreme Court's minor premise. That decision 
recognized the important exception that a suit challenging the federal 
constitutionality of a state official's action is not one against the state. 
The Supreme Court created this fiction and the judicial creator has 
184. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55 (2d ed. 1983). 
See generally Baker, Constitutional Law, 27 Loy. L. REV. 80S, 815-19 (1981). 
185. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). 
186. See McGruder v. Necaise, 733 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. June 1984) (citing Pen-
nhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984». See also Clay v. Texas 
Women's Univ., 728 F.2d 714, 715-16 (5th Cir. Mar. 1984). 
187. The litigation history is complicated. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospi-
tal, 446 F.Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd in part & rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), 
rev'd & remanded, 451 U.S. I (1981), on remand, 673 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1982) (en bane), rev'd 
& remanded, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). 
188. Lummis v. White, 629 F.2d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Worcester County Trust 
Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 296-300 (1937». 
189. [d. at 401-02. 
190. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
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since maintained control. The Court had declined to extend the fic-
tion to allow costly retroactive relief based on the supremacy of fed-
eral law. 191 The Halderman majority concluded that there was no 
need to reconcile the states' immunity with state law. It held that 
state law claims against state officials brought into federal court under 
pendent jurisdiction were barred by the eleventh amendment. In As a 
result of this holding, the Court realized that many federal claims 
would be brought in state courts or the federal and state claims would 
be bifurcated and proceed independently. But the majority concluded 
that efficiency, convenience, and fairness were not part of the eleventh 
amendment. 193 
While I can resist the temptation to launch a long exploration of 
this precedent here, I cannot overemphasize its importance. In the 
Fifth Circuit, appending state law claims to federal claims has been an 
everyday occurrence. 194 All of that is changed now. The eleventh 
amendment seems to require that we sort through claims against state 
officials and assign those sounding in federal law to the federal court 
and those sounding in state law to the state court, although the later 
forum can hear both. 
Considerations of federalism also overwhelm decisions about the 
relations between the federal courts and their counterpart state 
courts. For example, federal district courts do not have appellate ju-
risdiction to review, modify, or nullify a final order of a state court. 
As basic as this principle is, it was controverted in Howell v. State Bar 
of Texas. 195 In Howell, the plaintiff brought a civil rights action chal-
lenging the result of a state court disciplinary proceeding against him. 
The district court dismissed and a Fifth Circuit panel reversed. 196 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration under 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman. 197 In Feldman the 
Supreme Court had held that in such claims the district court has no 
jurisdiction involving such state judicial proceedings even if the con-
stitution is invoked. That review was saved for the Supreme Court 
191. E<ileman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
192. 104 S. Ct. at 917-19. 
193. Id. at 919-21. See also supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text. 
194. See, e.g., Breath v. Cronvich, 734 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. June 1984); Wheeler v. Cosden 
Oil and Chern. Co., 734 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. June 1984); Clay v. Texas Women's Univ., 728 F.2d 
714 (5th Cir. March 1984); Howard v. Fortenberry, 723 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. Feb. 1984). 
195. 710 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2152 (1984). 
196. 674 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1982). 
197. 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983). 
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alone. The district court does have jurisdiction, however, over gen-
eral challenges to state bar rules promulgated extrajudicially which do 
not involve a final judgment of a state court. In Howell, the Fifth 
Circuit panel simply followed that distinction on remand. 198 
B. Abstention 
The abstention doctrines provide a most important mechanism 
for adjusting the tension between the two judiciaries. During the sur-
vey period, the court relied on the Pullman doctrine and the Younger 
doctrine. 199 
The Pullman abstention doctrine, named for the Supreme Court 
decision of creation,2°O provides that "a federal court may, and ordi-
narily should, refrain from deciding a case in which state action is 
challenged in federal court as contrary to the federal constitution if 
there are unsettled questions of state law that may be dispositive of 
the case and avoid the need for deciding the constitutional ques-
tion."201 Such positive statements of the doctrine coexist in Fifth Cir-
cuit case law with hostile precedents which emphasize that the 
principle is judicially created and controlled and should be a severely 
198. 710 F.2d at 1078. 
199. A third abstention doctrine, not used during the survey period, takes its name from 
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Such abstention is appropriate when the federal 
court should defer to the state's administration of its own affairs. The federal suit is dismissed 
to avoid needless conflict with matters of local concern. See generally 17 C. WRIGHT, A. 
MILLER, & E. COOPER, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4245 (1976). 
Two other hybrids of abstention also did not figure in survey developments. Some federal 
courts have stayed their hand if there is a parallel state court action pending or if a diversity 
case will oblige the decision of a difficult state law question. See United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964), cerro denied sub nom. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. First 
National Bank, 377 U.S. 935 (1965); P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 
1951); Mottolese V. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949). Modern Supreme Court prece-
dents render such wild-cat abstentions very suspect. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. V. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
200. Railroad Comm'n V. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generally Fuld, Absten-
tion in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1071 (1974). 
201. United Home Rentals, Inc. v. Texas Real Estate Comm'n, 716 F.2d 324, 331 (5th 
Cir. Oct. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1712 (1984). 
Penhurst State School & Hospital may have a significant effect on Pullman abstention. See 
supra notes 186-195 and accompanying text. The decision may reduce the frequency of this 
type of abstention because the federal courts will not have as many state law claims to use to 
avoid federal issues. Most likely, the federal courts will decide more federal issues since the 
alternative state law issues will not be before them. 
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circumscribed exception to a general rule of going forward. 202 A fre-
quently quoted Fifth Circuit version lists three considerations: 
whether the disposition of a state law issue might eliminate or narrow 
the scope of the federal constitutional issue; whether the question of 
state law is important and obscure; and whether a federal decision 
might later conflict with state court decisions and the regulatory 
scheme. 203 There is also a dimension of judicial hierarchy involved 
since the issue is discretionary with the district court. If the survey 
decisions are representative, the Fifth Circuit is more reluctant to re-
verse a decision to abstain than to reverse a decision not to abstain. 
This may be explained by the nature of Pullman abstention which 
does not prevent federal court review, but merely postpones it for 
good reason. The decisions do give some good examples of the court's 
attitude. Abstention was proper when the scope and entitlement of 
indigent residents under state law was uncertain in a suit challenging 
the criteria for the controverted aid;204 when a state statute is suscep-
tible of two constructions one of which will obviate the federal consti-
tutional issue;205 and, when the constitutionality of a state agency's 
interpretation of a state statute was the subject of review in the state 
agency or state courts.206 Abstention was not proper when the paral-
lel state action at issue had been concluded prior to the motion to 
abstain207 and when the constitutional preemption issue would exist 
regardless of which of the competing interpretations of a state statute 
was chosen.208 
Today's Younger abstention doctrine, sometimes called the non-
intervention doctrine and often euphemised the doctrine of "Our Fed-
eralism," may be traced to a 1971 Supreme Court decision209 and its 
sequellae. 210 Based on considerations of equity, comity, and federal-
202. Pietzsch v. Mattox, 719 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. Nov. 1983). 
203. High OI'Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1980). 
204. Mireles v. Crosby County, 724 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984). 
205. Pietzsch v. Mattox, 719 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir. Nov. 1983). Even ifI could add my 
vote for reversal to Judge Tate's, "we" would still affirm by an equally divided court. [d. at 
132-34 (Tate, J., dissenting). 
206. United Home Rentals v. Texas Real Estate Comm'n, 716 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. Oct. 
1983). Judge Tate would lose 3: 1 if I had a vote in this one. [d. at 334-35 (Tate, J., dissenting). 
207. Dorsey v. Moore, 719 F.2d 1263, 1265 (5th Cir. Nov. 1983). 
208. KVUE, Inc., v. Moore, 709 F.2d 922, 931 (5th Cir. July 1983). 
209. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
210. E.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 
922 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 
(1974); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. 
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). 
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ism, a federal district court must abstain from granting either declara-
tory or injunctive relief when a state criminal action or its equivalent 
is pending against the federal plaintiff. DeSpain v. Johnston 211 repre-
sents a thoughtful Fifth Circuit application during the survey period. 
The Younger doctrine strikes the balance between state and federal 
interests after due consideration of the nature of the state proceedings, 
the timing of the federal proceedings, and the need for a federal forum 
to protect the constitutional right. First, there is a presumption that a 
federal court should abstain when a state criminal proceeding is pend-
ing which is overcome only by a showing of bad faith or an 'intent to 
harass. 212 This presumption applies to certain state civil proceedings 
when the importance of the state interest is analogous to that of a 
criminal prosecution. 213 When the federal action follows the state ac-
tion the need for abstention is greatest, and the state interest contin-
ues through the completion of the state appellate process.214 To 
overcome the presumption for abstention, the federal plaintiff must 
demonstrate that there will be no opportunity to raise the federal issue 
in the state proceeding.215 In DeSpain, the court held that the district 
court should have abstained from granting a restraining order effec-
tively halting a legitimate state investigation into an allegation of 
child abuse and enjoining a pending state court proceeding. The im-
portance of the state interest was obvious. State court jurisdiction had 
already been invoked when an investigator for a state agency re-
quested an ex parte state court order to cooperate in the investigation 
and remained pending until the conclusion of the unavailed state ap-
peal. The state procedure for a motion to dissolve the ex parte order 
to cooperate provided an opportunity to litigate the federal issues, and 
the federal plaintiffs could not rely on their failure to pursue that op-
portunity to be heard. Nothing in the record suggested the applica-
tion of an exception to the general rule. 216 Federalism obliged 
abstention. 
In one-half the states, another federal court abstention option ex-
211. 731 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. May 1984). See also McDonald v. Burrows, 731 F.2d 294 
(5th Cir. May 1984) (held federal injunction was not appropriate against state extradition and 
criminal prosecution notwithstanding ongoing bankruptcy proceedings). 
212. 401 U.S. at 47. 
213. 420 U.S. at 605. See also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979). 
214. See 420 U.S. at 608; Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 252 (5th Cir. 1973). 
215. 442 U.S. at 425-26, 430. 
216. Indeed, the Supreme Court had recently evaluated the particular state scheme in 
Moore v. Sims, id. at 415. 
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ists as a creation of state procedure, certification of state questions to 
the highest state court for decision. 217 The device is discretionary and 
the federal court wisely should evaluate the strengths and weaknesses 
in the particular situation. The Supreme Court has observed that "[i]t 
does .. .in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build 
a cooperative judicial federalism."218 Pullman abstention cases are 
the most appropriate candidates for certification.219 Rather than stay 
or dismiss the federal action to allow the parties to pursue a declara-
tory judgment through state trial and appellate proceedings, the certi-
fication device puts the question directly to the state supreme court. 
While there is some legitimate disagreement on the general desirabil-
ity of certification, most commentators,220 this one included, are con-
vinced that the option adds to our federalism. 
Louisiana has a certification procedure. 221 The Fifth Circuit may 
certify questions of state law to the Louisiana Supreme Court and 
regularly does SO.222 The Louisiana Supreme Court may answer the 
questions and regularly does SO.223 Mississippi has a certification pro-
cedure.224 The Fifth Circuit may certify questions of state law to the 
Mississippi Supreme Court and regularly does SO.225 The Mississippi 
217. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 
U.S. 207 (1960). See generally 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE, § 4248 (1978). 
218. 416 U.S. at 39\. 
219. C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 315. 
220. E.g., Brown, Certification-Federalism in Action, 7 CUM. L. REV. 455 (1977); Roth, 
Certified Questions from the Federal Courts: Review and Re-proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 
(1979). 
22\' LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:72:1 (West Supp. 1983); L. SUP. CT. R. XII. 
222. See, e.g., Sandefur v. Cherry, 721 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983); Sturgeon v. Strachan 
Shipping Co., 731 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. May 1984) (en bane), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3269 
(Oct. 9, 1984) (No. 84-222); McCain v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 
Nov. 1983). 
Of course, the federal court is not required to do so. See Thompson v. Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581,583-85 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 
104 S.Ct. 1598 (1984). 
223. E.g., Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 720 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983) (disposition on 
basis of state court answer). 
Of course, the state court may decline to answer. E.g., Sturgeon v. Strachan Shipping 
Co., 731 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. May 1984) (en bane), cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3269 (Oct. 9, 1984) 
(No. 84-222); Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984). 
224. MISS. SUP. CT. R. 46. 
225. See Mills v. Danison Oil Corp., 720 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983); Allstate Ins. Corp. 
v. Randall, 708 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. July 1983). 
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Supreme Court may answer the questions and regularly does SO.226 
Texas has no certification procedure. The Fifth Circuit cannot ask 
and the Texas Supreme Court cannot answer questions of state law. 
The reason is that such a procedure would violate the Texas Supreme 
Court's broad definition of the state constitution's ban on advisory 
opinions. 227 Texas may, however, come on-line soon. An ad hoc 
committee has been appointed to draft a proposal for allowing federal 
court certification of state law to the Texas Supreme Court. That 
committee, chaired by Chief Judge Sessions of the Western District of 
Texas, has proposed a state constitutional amendment authorizing the 
Texas Supreme Court to develop certification procedures. The propo-
sal to place the matter on the ballot will be part of the legislative 
program of the Supreme Court and State Bar of Texas at the next 
session of the legislature. 228 Such an option would be preferable to 
the present difficulties the court has in extrapolating from Texas state 
court decisions which may be scarce, confusing or conflicting. 229 Cer-
tainly a panel certification ending in a definitive state law ruling 
would be preferable to the delay, expense and waste of judicial re-
sources on rehearing in an en banc court230 "writing on the wind. "231 
We must await further legislative and electoral developments. 
C. Habeas Corpus 
There is agreement that "The Great Writ" has become the 
226. See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 727 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. Mar. 1984); 
Nelson v. James, 714 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983). 
Of course, the state court may decline to answer. E.g., Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 719 
F.2d 785 (5th Cir. Nov. 1983). 
227. See United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965), (commented 
on in Note, Refusal of State Court to Assume Jurisdiction After Federal Abstention, 20 Sw. L.J. 
402 (1966); Note, Courts - Advisory Opinions - State Court Has No Jurisdiction to Render a 
Declaratory Judgment When a Federal Court Has Abstained and Retained Jurisdiction Over the 
Case, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1394 (1966). 
228. Letter from Honorable William S. Sessions, Chief Judge United States District Court 
for the Western District of Texas, to Professor Thomas E. Baker (June 18,1984). 
Model provisions have been drafted. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE STUDY OF DIVI· 
SION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1374(e) (Official Draft 
1969); 12 UNIFORM STATE LAWS 49-56 (1967). 
229. See e.g., Harris v. Sentry Title Co., 715 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983), cert. denied, 
104 S. Ct. 2679 (1984); Marcotte v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 709 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. July 
1983). 
230. Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. Apr. 1984). 
231. Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1598 (1984). 
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"'Great(ly Abused) Writ.' "232 There is disagreement, however, 
about just who the abusers are. Those on one side suggest that state 
prisoners have perverted the procedure destroying finality and doing 
violence to federalism. 233 Those on the other side say that the 
Supreme Court has seriously harmed what a leading commentator on 
the writ calls "the machinery by which great and familiar substantive 
principles are translated into effective law. "234 The statistics tell the 
true story. During the year ending June 30, 1983, a judgment for the 
petitioner was entered in 174 out of 8,176 federal applications for the 
writ nationwide, about 3%.235 While most habeas petitioners appear 
pro se, the lawyer reader might be appointed or choose to appear pro 
bono publico. This discussion then becomes more practical beyond 
the issues of federalism involved.236 During the survey period, feder-
alism issues were debated in the context of the exhaustion require-
ment, res judicata, and procedural default. 237 
The leading Fifth Circuit decision on exhaustion of state reme-
dies is Vela v. Estelle.238 The principle there may be stated succinctly: 
232. GaItieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 365 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Hill, J., specially 
concurring). 
233. Because this section addresses Our Federalism, I do not discuss decisions under 28 
U .S.c. § 2255 (1982), although some issues are similar. The Fifth Circuit's federal prisoner 
docket emphasizes direct criminal appeals and such decisions are scarce anyway. See United 
States v. Saldana, 731 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. May 1984); United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41 
(5th Cir. July 1983); Alford v. United States, 709 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. July 1983). 
234. L. Y ACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES v (1981). 
235. Rodriguez v. McKaskle, 724 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. Feb. 1984). The writ is granted 
"in at most 4% of the cases in which it is sought." C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 53, at 345. 
236. It must be a bit disconcerting to have one's name spread in the pages of the reports 
and headnoted under key numbers about incompetent and ineffective counsel. Cf Jones v. 
Estelle, 722 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983) (petitioners failure to interject ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim in second habeas petition worked waiver of said claim in third petition, there-
fore effective assistance standard met), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. McKaskle, 104 S. Ct. 
2356 (1984); Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. July 1983). See infra note 239. 
237. Other traditional habeas topics were less controversial. Battieste v. Baton Rouge, 732 
F.2d 439 (5th Cir. May 1984) (custody); Rumbaugh v. McKaskle, 730 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. Apr. 
1984) (standing of next friend); Davis v. Page, 714 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 735 (1984) (relationship to civil rights action). 
238. 708 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. July 1983), cert. denied sub nom. McKaskle V. Vela, 104 S. Ct. 
736 (1984). "Vela and the cases it cited represent the law of the circuit." Rodriguez v. McK-
askle, 724 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. Feb. 1984). 
Here I follow what a colleague in the same situation of advocate-commentator called "the 
time honored distinction among practitioners between 'the interesting cases' and the 'other 
fellow's cases.''' Baier, Constitutional Law, 29 Loy. L. REV. 647, 649 (1983). I served as 
court-appointed counsel in the Fifth Circuit and before the Supreme Court on behalf of the 
Petitioner, Conrado U. Vela. This footnote "should be regarded as an admission required by 
candor rather than as an assertion impelled by immodesty." F. WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER 
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"a state prisoner must normally exhaust all available state remedies 
before he can apply for federal habeas relief. . . . "239 The principle is 
not jurisdictional. Rather, the requirement derives from considera-
tions of comity, "serv[ing] to minimize friction between our federal 
and state systems of justice by allowing the State an initial opportu-
nity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal 
rights. "240 To satisfy the principle, a habeas petitioner must have 
"fairly presented the substance" of the claim to the state court. 241 
Usually, the answer is clear whether the particular claim was242 or 
was not243 presented in the state forum. Cases like Vela and the sur-
vey decision Rodriguez v. McKaskle 244 exemplify the more difficult 
application. In Vela, the right to counsel issue had been presented pro 
se in the state courts and in the federal district court identifying only 
three critical incidents of incompetence at the state sentencing hear-
ing. Before the Fifth Circuit, appointed counsel emphasized those 
three egregious errors and identified dozens of other inadequacies in 
the transcript to demonstrate a cumulative ineffectiveness. The State 
cried foul for lack of exhaustion. The court held that the claim had 
been exhausted because the entire record had been before the state 
court which had, in fact, applied a totality of the circumstances defini-
tion of effectiveness of counseI.245 In Rodriguez, however, while the 
claim of ineffectiveness had been raised generally before the state 
court, the particular inadequacies argued were dehors the record and 
had been developed for the first time in the federal district court hear-
ing and were first fully decided there. Therefore, the petition was dis-
missed even though, in the court's words, "[n]ow that the case has 
been tried, a decision on the merits would eliminate the need for fur-
MILITARY JUSTICE at 3 n.1 (1967). I also note my strong disagreement with Former Chief 
Judge Brown's remonstrance that "it is a disruptive confusion of roles for law professors to 
participate actively as counsel in actual cases, trial or appellate." Brown, Is the Corpus (Juris) 
Terminally Ill?, 12 TEX. TECH L. REV. 13, 19 (1981). 
239. 708 F.2d at 958. See also 28 U.S.c. § 2254(b)(c) (1982). 
240. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1,3 (1981). See also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 
(1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971). 
241. 708 F.2d at 958. 
242. Browne v. Estelle, 712 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983) (precise issue raised on direct 
and collateral appeals to state courts and precedents decided afterwards need not be 
reexhausted). 
243. Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. May 1984) (equal protection claim not 
previously presented to state court). 
244. 724 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. Feb. 1984). 
245. See Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 104 S. 
Ct. 2039 (1984). 
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ther effort by the state judicial system, reduce further litigation ex-
pense, avoid delay, and eliminate the possible need for later judicial 
review."246 A federal district court must dismiss a "mixed" petition 
containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims and the court of 
appeals may not rule on only the exhausted claim unless it was the 
only claim in the district court and the unexhausted claims were ad-
ded on appeaP47 The state may waive the exhaustion requirement 
either expressly or implicitly, as it is not jurisdictionaI.248 In fact, the 
federal court will overlook the failure to exhaust when the delay of 
state court resolution is so extreme that direct appellate review cannot 
be considered an effective state court remedy. A pattern of such delay 
occurred as a consequence of the serious backlog of cases in the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals. Appellate delays up to five years meant 
that the state prisoner could serve half of a severe sentence without 
being able to exhaust state remedies.249 That situation was too much 
for the Fifth Circuit, although recent state court reforms should ease 
the state docket problem.250 
Traditionally, habeas procedure is an exception to the doctrine of 
res judicata and a federal court may grant relief in spite of a prior 
rejection of the claim by a state court. 251 There is, however, a statu-
tory presumption of correctness in state court findings of historical 
fact.252 There must, of course, have been a state hearing with factual 
246. 724 F.2d at 467. 
247. Williams v. Maggio, 727 F.2d 1387, 1389 (5th Cir. Mar. 1984). 
The law in this area has changed rapidly. See Burns v. Estelle, 695 F.2d 847, 851 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (abandoning Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc». See 
also Hill & Baker, supra note 45, at 66-68. 
248. McGee v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 1206, 1210, 1212 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984) (en banc); Resendez 
v. McKaskle, 722 F.2d 227, 229 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984). 
249. Vail v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983). See also Shelton v. Heard, 
696 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983). 
250. Jurisdiction to hear criminal appeals was divided among all the Texas intermediate 
courts in 1980. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § I. 
251. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 n.12 (1980); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 456 
(1953). 
Since 1976, fourth amendment issues have not been relitigable unless the petitioner dem-
onstrates a lack of an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the issues in the state court. 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976); Brantley v. McKaskle, 722 F.2d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 
Jan. 1984). An alleged error oflaw by the state court, even of constitutional law, is not enough 
to overcome the bar. Sonnier v. Maggio, 720 F.2d 401, 409 (5th Cir. Nov. 1983). 
252. 28 U.S.c. § 2254(d) (1982). In contrast, the district court is under a statutory obliga-
tion to make an independent determination of contested factual findings made by a magistrate. 
28 U.S.c. § 636(b)(1) (1982). See Hernandez v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. Aug. 
1983). 
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findings, express or implied.253 Such findings may not be upset merely 
because the federal court disagrees, but may be set aside if they lack 
fair support in the record.254 Under such a standard, state court fac-
tual findings are generally immune, but not always.255 State courts' 
legal conclusions are carefully excepted, however, to allow independ-
ent federal review. 256 In such situations, counsel are wise to include 
in their brief a separate introductory section on the applicable stan-
dard of review. 257 
Somewhat related to the relitigation between state and federal 
courts, the issue of relitigation in federal courts by successive petitions 
raises concerns for finality and against piecemeal petitions. Perhaps 
because they feel the writ has been abused recently, the judges seem 
more willing to invoke the power of dismissal for abuse of the writ, 
but appear reluctant to exercise it. Despite Supreme Court entreaties 
to make commonplace dismissals for abuse of the writ,258 in the Fifth 
Circuit actual dismissal is still of "rare and extraordinary applica-
tion."259 Dismissal is appropriate only when it is demonstrated that 
the petitioner either deliberately withheld a claim from a previous pe-
tition or was "inexcusably neglectful. "260 
Federalism also remains an important theme in consideration of 
a state's contemporaneous objection rule. The Supreme Court has 
253. Armstead v. Maggio. 720 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983); Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 
677 (5th Cir. Aug. 1983), cert. denied. 104 S. Ct. 1685 (1984). 
254. Maggio V. Fulford. 103 S. Ct. 2261 (1983); Marshall v. Lonberger, 103 S. Ct. 843 
(1983); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) (creates several 
specific categories for overcoming the presumption of correctness). 
255. Byrd V. McKaskle, 733 F.2d 1133, 1138 (5th Cir. June 1984); Carrillo v. Perkins, 723 
F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984); Dunn V. Maggio, 712 F.2d 998, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 
Aug. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1297 (1984); Asper v. Estelle, 709 F.2d 356, 357 (5th Cir. 
July 1983). 
256. Austin V. McKaskle, 724 F.2d 1153, 1156 (5th Cir. Feb. 1984); Plunkett v. Estelle, 
709 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. July 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1000 (1984). 
257. See G. RAHDERT & L. ROTH, ApPEALS TO THE FIFTH CIRCUIT MANUAL Ch. 21 at 
10 (1977). 
258. See Rose V. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520-21 (1982) (plurality); 28 U.S.c. § 2254 (1982) 
and Habeas Rule 9(b) following. See also Woodward v. Hutchins, 104 S. Ct. 752 (1984); 
Williams V. King, 104 S. Ct. 562 (1984). 
259. Vaughan V. Estelle. 671 F.2d 152, 153 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Poprskar V. Estelle, 
612 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1980». See generally Green v. City of Montezuma. 650 F.2d 
648, 650-51 (5th Cir. 1981). 
260. See Resendez v. McKaskle, 722 F.2d 227. 231 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984); Jones v. Estelle, 
722 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983) (en banc); Williams v. King, 722 F.2d 104, 105 (5th Cir. 
Dec. 1983); Baker V. Estelle, 715 F.2d 1031, 1034 (5th Cir. Sept. 1983). cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 
1609 (1984); Sockwell V. Maggio, 709 F.2d 341. 344 (5th Cir. July 1983). 
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held that when a state prisoner procedurally defaults a claim by fail-
ing to comply with the state's requirement for a contemporaneous ob-
jection the issue is precluded likewise in the federal habeas court 
absent some showing of cause and prejudice. 261 The Fifth Circuit is 
strict in applying this rule even to the extent of not considering an 
issue when defense counsel's objection was only on state law grounds 
and did not raise or preserve a federal constitutional issue involving 
the same testimony.262 The exception for cause and prejudice is still 
of uncertain dimension. 263 In Fifth Circuit decisions, however, it is 
almost certain that the court will refuse to find the exception satisfied, 
at least for a failure to object at trial. 264 The contrapositive of the rule 
also applies. When a state court has reached the issue despite the 
want of a preserving objection, the federal court is not barred by the 
principles of federalism from likewise deciding the issue. 265 There are 
cases in which it is not clear just what the state court has done. Usu-
ally, any ambiguity is resolved in favor of the petitioner, as it should 
be, for the federalism concern is for the state court and not for the 
state respondent. 266 
Justice Holmes once observed, "habeas corpus cuts through all 
forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure."267 Once the fed-
eral habeas court decides to reach the merits, the review includes all 
the rights we hold most sacred. 268 Arrayed against these concerns are 
261. Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
262. Byrd v. McKaskle, 733 F.2d 1133, 1139 (5th Cir. June 1984). 
263. See generally Comment, Habeas Corpus - The Supreme Court Defines The Wain-
wright v. Sykes "Cause and Prejudice" Standard, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 441 (1983). Cf 
Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2913 n.1 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Part of the Court's 
opinion suggests that it might be of two minds on the matter."). 
264. See Weaver v. McKaskle, 733 F.2d 1103, 1105-07 (5th Cir. May 1984) (discussing 
Fifth Circuit case law). 
265. Plunkett v. Estelle, 709 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. July 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 
1000 (1984). 
266. A per curiam survey decision may claim aberrational status. Rollins v. Maggio, 711 
F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. July 1983) (phrase "[t]here is no merit in petitioner's claim" in state 
court opinion deemed not sufficient). Judge Randall was correct to point out precedents hold-
ing more ambiguous language sufficient. ld. at 594 (Randall, J., dissenting) (citing Henry v. 
Wainwright, 686 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983»; Clark v. 
Blackburn, 632 F.2d 531, 533 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980). Cf Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 
(1983). 
267. Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
268. See Byrd v. McKaskle, 733 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. June 1984) (due process in resentenc-
ing); Liner v. Phelps, 731 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. May 1984) (due process in indictment); Williams 
v. Maggio, 727 F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. March 1984) (voluntariness of confession); Carrillo v. 
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the most sobering of states' interests in enforcing the criminal law, 
including the application of the ultimate sanction - the death pen-
alty. The Fifth Circuit has become somewhat preoccupied with the 
death penalty as a result of the frequency with which the death pen-
alty is imposed in its three states. According to the latest available 
government statistics, at year end 1981 there were approximately 838 
persons under sentence of death in the United States and 181 of them 
are on death row in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. 269 Habeas de-
cisions in death cases are a significant point of federalism friction.270 
In October, the court recognized this and adopted new rules and new 
procedures to enhance the fairness and efficiency with which these 
cases are processed. A portion of the court's Preliminary Statement is 
instructive here: 
Because cases in which a federal district court or the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals is asked to stay execution of a state court 
judgment always involve issues of fundamental importance and re-
quire handling with meticulous care, the Fifth Circuit Judicial 
Council has undertaken a study of the procedures followed in this 
circuit when such relief is sought. This occurs most often in cases 
in which a state court has sentenced a defendant to be executed. 
The legal questions presented are usually complex and difficult. 
The life of an accused may be at stake. Vital state interests may be 
involved. Yet the petitioner seeks reversal of the judgment of a 
state court, frequently that of the state's highest court. We must 
assure that all of the constitutional rights of the parties have been 
protected, and we must also observe the constitutional division of 
authority between the state and federal courts. When the case in-
volves capital punishment, our decision affects not only the ac-
cused but also the interests of the victim's family and the pUblic.271 
One partial solution for the procedural problems inherent in these 
Perkins, 723 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. Jan. 1984)(right to confrontation); Armstead v. Maggio, 720 
F.2d 894 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983) (assistance of counsel); Plunkett v. Estelle, 709 F.2d 1005 (5th 
Cir. July 1983), cerro denied, 104 S. Ct. 1000 (1984) (procedural due process); Holmes v. King, 
709 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. July 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 429 (1984) (self-incrimination). 
269. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1981, at 6 
(Dec. 1981) (persons under sentence of death, by jurisdiction, year end 1981). See also 
Thompson V. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1505 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that the Eleventh 
Circuit contains one-third of prisoners under sentence of death in country). 
270. See e.g., Narcisse v. Maggio, 725 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. Feb. 1984); Skillern V. Estelle, 
720 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. Dec. 1983); Autry v. Estelle, 719 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. Oct. 1983); 
Williams V. King, 719 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. Oct. 1983); Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 
July 1983); Porter V. Estelle, 709 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. July 1983). 
271. 718 F.2d No. 3-719 F.2d No. 1 at CXII (Dec. 5, 1983). See also 4th Cir. Local Rule 
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cases is beyond the court's power. In a speech at the 1984 Fifth Cir-
cuit Judicial Conference Governor Edwin W. Edwards of Louisiana 
suggested a new state procedure to reduce the intensity and frequency 
of federalism confrontations in death penalty reviews. 272 He sug-
gested that the state executive not establish an execution date until the 
state supreme court certifies that direct and collateral challenges are 
complete in both the state and the federal courts. In Governor Ed-
wards' suggestion, any subsequent federal application would then be 
subject to dismissal for abuse of the writ in all but the most excep-
tional cases. Of course, the state court decision that federal jurisdic-
tion was at an end would itself be a federal question. This state 
procedure would do much to eliminate the present difficulties of last 
minute stays of execution in which court, counsel, and prisoner act 
and react under such intense pressures. The court and Governor Ed-
wards are to be commended for developing creative strategies to cope 
with these most serious issues of federalism. 
22(b) 737 F.2d No. 2-738 F.2d No. I at CXXIII (July 2, 1984) (certificate and telephonic 
procedure in death penalty appeals). 
Counsel who regularly appear in the Fifth Circuit should obtain RULES OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF ApPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT (1983), which contains the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Local Rules of the Fifth Circuit, and the Internal Operating 
Procedures. 
272. Address by Honorable Edwin W. Edwards, 41st Judicial Conference of the Fifth Ju-
dicial Circuit, New Orleans, Louisiana (June I, 1984). 
